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Migrating Towards Minority Status: Shifting 
European Policy Towards Roma*
RACHEL GUGLIELMO
Open Society Institute 
TIMOTHY WILLIAM WATERS
University of Mississippi Law School
Abstract
During the 1990s, European policy towards Roma evolved from concern about 
migration toward rhetoric about rights. In this article we trace that shift across two 
OSCE reports. Following rhetorical-action models, we show how the EU’s commitment 
to enlargement and ‘common values’ compelled it to elaborate an internal approach to 
minority protection. Concerns about migration persist, but Europe now has to consider 
how to integrate Roma as minorities.
Introduction
Roma have wandered the borderlands of social legitimacy since their arrival 
in Europe centuries ago. Policies towards Roma in most European states have 
long been defined by majorities’ perceptions of Roma as outsiders. Despite a 
long history of settlement and co-existence, Roma remain the quintessential 
migrant group. Yet since the early 1990s there has been an evolution in European 
institutions’ policy towards Roma, from an open concern with the potentially 
destabilizing effects of westward migration to an increasing rhetorical emphasis 
on discrimination and positive minority rights. In this article, we trace the shift 
in two major reports addressing the situation of Roma drafted by one of the 
pre-eminent European institutions addressing minority issues during the 1990s, 
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the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).1 We examine the reasons 
why this shift took place and what it has signified in practical terms for the 
Roma and for European minority protection policy more broadly.
Rhetorical-action and deliberative models of policy formation (Schim-
melfennig, 2001; Neyer, 2003; Piana, 2004) are followed to demonstrate how 
the expansion of the European Union (EU) to include the countries of central 
and eastern Europe (CEE) effected a dynamic change in policies towards both 
migrants and minorities. The article argues that, although the EU and other 
European institutions were initially concerned with externally oriented migra-
tion control, the fact that the case for enlargement was articulated in terms of 
‘common values’ (Schimmelfennig, 2001) compelled EU Member States to 
elaborate a more internally oriented, rights-based approach to minority protec-
tion and towards Roma. Concerns about migration, security and integration 
that surfaced at the beginning of the accession process persist, but minority 
protection has decisively entered European policy and Europe’s self-image. 
It will become increasingly necessary to address Romani issues in a different 
register; in the light of this, prudent policy will consider not if, but how, Roma 
will be integrated into Europe as minorities.
Given their generally extreme marginalization,2 for many Roma a successful 
conceptual move from disregarded outsider to constitutive participant – from 
migrant to minority – could represent progress, even as material conditions 
continue to be extremely difficult for Romani communities in most countries 
(EUMAP, 2002). For Europe, a well-articulated minority protection policy 
could contribute to greater security and stability. The interaction between 
1 The HCNM reports are a useful framing device for examining trends in European minority policy. First, 
the reports were influential in policy formulation in other institutions: the European Commission relied 
on the HCNM and the Council of Europe in preparing its regular reports on accession, for example, while 
the HCNM’s 2000 report recommendations formed one of the bases for the guiding principles adopted by 
the European Council at Tampere (Cocen Group, 1999). Second, the fact that a single institution produced 
these two reports at the beginning and latter stages of the accession process allows us to inquire into ways 
in which rhetoric and policy changed and interacted during the 1990s.
2 Nothing in this article assumes a monolithic identity for Europe’s Roma, or for its majority populations. 
Some Roma are assimilated, others marginalized; some are poor, others wealthy; some are illiterate, others 
have doctorates. When we speak of Roma, we encompass that diversity, allowing that many Roma chal-
lenge a common identity and even that ‘Roma’ as a constructed category conceals as much as it explains. 
At the same time, nothing is gained by a sterile and paralytically correct formalism that incessantly invokes 
heterogeneity against all generalization. Roma are extraordinarily diverse and share certain features about 
which we may usefully say certain things, while refusing to do so has costs – making it difficult to say 
anything meaningful about discrimination or to derive meaning from the observation that most (though not 
all) Roma have dramatically lower levels of education, employment, wealth and life prospects than most 
(though not all) members of the majorities with which they live (see Hancock, ‘Foreword’, in Guy, 2001, 
p. ix). Finally, it is demonstrable that majority populations do in fact generalize about Roma; this ‘negative’ 
ascription of common identity has important social and policy implications even if many Roma resist it 
(Waters, 1995, pp. 25–6, 39–41; Lucassen et al., 1998, p. 6). However inaccurate such ascription may be, 
predictions about policy must take it into account; this article does so.
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SHIFTING EUROPEAN POLICY TOWARDS ROMA
rhetoric and policy from the early 1990s to the closing days of accession 
suggests such expectations are not unwarranted, although policy-makers still 
confront questions about the interrelatedness of rights, investment and security 
approaches, practical questions about the relationship of those models to 
funding priorities, and questions about the role of intention and social attitudes 
in shaping policy.
I. Roma: Migrating toward Minority Status
Europe’s highly diverse communities of Roma have been moving from migrant 
to minority status only very slowly and with many setbacks. An historical re-
view of policies towards Roma reveals a strong security-oriented bias; though 
differing in method, most policies have shared the basic aim of controlling 
populations viewed as alien, untrustworthy and destabilizing. 
Ancestors of the Roma migrated into Europe from northern India from the 
eleventh to the fifteenth centuries. Their origins were unknown to but clearly 
distinct from those of the European peoples among whom they settled. Contem-
porary European images of Roma as permanent migrants may be traced in part 
to the hostile response their presence and difference provoked: some observers 
have asserted that the mobility and insularity of some Romani communities 
has been a way of preserving identity in an uncertain, non-Romani environ-
ment (Council of Europe, 1999; Hancock, 1999). At the same time, cultural 
differences between Romani and majority communities have prompted some 
degree of voluntary separation and have sometimes also given rise to conflict 
(Pogány, 2004, pp. 26–30; Lucassen et al., 1998, p. 9). Even after permanent 
Romani settlements became the norm, especially in central and eastern Europe, 
exclusion of the ‘migratory outsider’ remained a self-justifying policy.
When concepts of minority rights gained currency in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries and the inter-war period, some Roma seized the op-
portunity to organize themselves (Crowe, 1994, p. xiv). However, traditional 
minority protection policies were not designed with Roma in mind, and the 
benefits Roma derived were peripheral to those policies’ purpose.3 In post-war 
socialist systems in particular, Roma – who lacked a kin state – were often 
categorized as ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘national’ minorities, a distinction relegating 
them to a secondary minority status with less preferential treatment, despite in 
many instances being as ‘old’ and long-settled as other communities.4 In any 
3 None of the major instances of minority protection in European history – the Treaty of Westphalia, the 
Ottoman millet, the Congress of Vienna, the inter-war minority regimes – afforded rights to Roma, or even 
contemplated them as subjects (see Hannum, 1990, pp. 50–4).
4 Inter-war Czechoslovakia’s ‘criterion for recognizing its various ethnic minorities rested upon whether 
they were represented by a nation state or not … . Roma did not, despite being one of the largest minority 
populations in Czechoslovakia, because there was no Romani homeland’ (Hancock, 1999).
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case, the benefits proved an insufficient corrective to dominant perceptions of 
Romani difference as a threat, to discrimination and exclusion arising from 
that perception, and to policies designed to eliminate that difference or their 
presence altogether.5 This context is crucial to understanding the often scepti-
cal stance towards ‘Roma policies’ among Roma, (Council of Europe, 1999, 
para. 18) and the emphasis Romani leaders place on meaningful participation 
in policy-making processes (Mirga and Gheorghe, 1997; Klimová-Alexander, 
2005, pp. 121–3).
II. The HCNM Reports
At the outset of enlargement in the early 1990s the European Community (EC) 
had no minority policy of its own. However, EC Member States were concerned 
about ethno-national conflicts in some CEE candidate states and the possibility 
of migration flows into the EC.6 Both issues implicated minority populations. 
Lacking a legal and policy framework to address these issues, the EC took two 
significant steps. First, it included ‘respect for and protection of minorities’ 
in the Copenhagen criteria for accession adopted by the European Council in 
June 1993 (Copenhagen Criteria, 1993, Sec. 7.A.iii). These applied only to 
candidates, so the EC was able, at least initially, to develop a minority policy 
for candidate states without affecting policy within the EC. 
Second, the European Commission relied on the OSCE (formerly the CSCE) 
and the Council of Europe (CoE) in developing its policy (Hughes and Sasse, 
2003, pp. 7–19; Vermeersch, 2003, p. 8). Both organizations had engaged in a 
flurry of standard-setting on minority rights immediately following the fall of 
the Berlin Wall,7 and both had focused on applying and implementing these 
standards in the CEE region. Resort to these institutions was thus consistent with 
and reinforced the EU’s determination to engage minority issues in candidate 
states without developing its own minority policy – and its determination to 
deal with the question of minorities before accession and outside the Union.
5 In the past, policies to eliminate Romani difference have included: forced removal of children from 
families; criminal penalties for speaking Romanes; citizenship and pass document restrictions; and forced 
resettlement and assimilation. Policies to eliminate Roma entirely have included: expulsion and deporta-
tion; bounties for killing Roma; forced sterilization; medical experimentation; and the Nazi genocide. For 
comprehensive histories of policy towards Roma, see Crowe and Kolsti (1991); Kenrick and Puxon (1972); 
for brief surveys, see Kenrick (1998, pp. 1–7); Fraser (2000, pp. 17–31).
6 See Council of the European Community (1991); European Council (1992). The European Community 
became the European Union on 1 November 1993.
7 The CSCE became the OSCE on 21 December 1994. The Council of Europe adopted the Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages (CRML) in 1992, Recommendation 1201 (1993) and the Framework 
Convention on National Minorities (FCNM) in 1994. The CSCE adopted several documents that addressed 
minority issues in general, such as the Charter of Paris (CSCE, 1990a), and Roma in particular, including 
the Copenhagen Document (CSCE, 1990b), the Moscow Document (CSCE, 1991a), the Geneva Report 
(CSCE, 1991b), and the Helsinki Document (CSCE, 1992). 
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SHIFTING EUROPEAN POLICY TOWARDS ROMA
When the HCNM first addressed the situation of Roma in 1993, EU en-
largement was just getting underway; western European states were  concerned 
about the possibility of massive and potentially destabilizing migration by 
Roma from CEE states, a concern reflected and prioritized in the HCNM’s 
report. By 2000, when the HCNM issued his second report on the Roma, CEE 
states were just steps away from accession; this second report does not address 
migration, instead placing strong emphasis on advancing human rights, fighting 
discrimination and promoting effective participation in public life. 
The HCNM Report of 1993
By April 1993, only months after the HCNM took office,8 the OSCE com-
mittee of senior officials (on which all EU states are represented) had already 
requested him to:
study the social, economic and humanitarian problems relating to the Roma 
population in some participating States and the relevance of these problems 
to the Mandate of the High Commissioner … and to report thereon to the 
Committee of Senior Officials through the Chairman-in-Office. (HCNM, 
1993, p. 2) 
This seems a curiously high level of concern, given the HCNM’s mandate for 
conflict prevention: was an international conflict involving Roma imminent, 
or were Roma engaging in violent protests that could affect ‘peace, stability 
or relations between participating States’?9 In his September 1993 report, the 
HCNM seemed to anticipate such questions:
In the discussion [with the Committee], it was furthermore stated that these 
problems, which fall into the larger category of migration problems, could also 
have an international dimension. (HCNM, 1993, p. 2; emphasis added)
The allusion to internal discussions suggests that concerns about Roma migra-
tion from the CEE states into western Europe in fact constituted the primary 
motivation behind the Committee’s request.10 This interpretation is borne out by 
the report itself. Though going beyond the ‘social, economic and humanitarian’ 
situation of Roma to discuss discrimination and violence, the report was careful 
to present these problems in the light of the Committee’s implicit concern:
The aim, in short, should be to improve the ‘quality of life’ in migration-
producing countries (and areas within those countries) for the sake of such 
8 The first HCNM, Max van der Stoel, was appointed in December 1992 and took office in January 1993.
9 The HCNM should ‘provide “early warning”… at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving 
national minority issues that have the potential to develop into a conflict within the CSCE area, affecting 
peace, stability, or relations between participating States’ (CSCE, 1992, emphasis added).
10 Even the formulation concerning migration does not obviously fall within the plain meaning of the HCNM’s 
mandate – an example, in a European but non-EU setting, of ‘creeping competence’ (Pollack, 1994).
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improvements, but also for the reduction in pressures on international migra-
tion. In addition to commerce, investment, and development assistance leading 
to economic opportunity, efforts at addressing the specific problems of the 
Roma, including discrimination and violence against them, will contribute 
considerably to improving their ‘quality of life.’ Such efforts are likely to 
encourage people to continue their lives where they already are. (HCNM, 
1993, p. 11, emphasis added) 11
Formally, the report addressed all OSCE states. However, it focused on 
‘migration-producing countries’, even though similar patterns of exclusion, 
violence and discrimination could have been traced in western European 
countries (EUMAP, 2002; ERRC, 1996, 2000, 2003); it advised countries on 
the receiving end of migration to ensure they had humane refugee policies 
(HCNM, 1993, pp. 14–15). The report clearly responds to the Committee’s 
underlying interest: not conflict prevention, but migration prevention.
In several respects, however, the HCNM went beyond a narrow interpreta-
tion of the Committee’s interests, contributing to important changes in the way 
minority issues would come to be spoken of in European institutions. First, the 
fact that the Roma – as noted above, traditionally an ‘ethnic minority’ – were 
the subject of a report by the High Commissioner on National Minorities sent 
a strong signal that there would not be any distinction in treatment accorded 
to ethnic as opposed to national minority groups – at least in the CEE region. 
This approach already prevailed in theory (Capotorti, 1979, p. 119) but, in 
practice, classification of Roma as an ethnic minority had continued in many 
CEE states12 and some EU members as well.13 Partly due to pressure from the 
HCNM and other European institutions, such distinctions have been eliminated 
from most CEE Roma and minority policies. 
Second, though the Committee had requested assessment of the ‘social, 
economic and humanitarian problems’ of Roma, the 1993 report also showed 
how Romani migration could be triggered by civil and political rights violations 
as well as socio-economic marginalization and recommended ‘implementation 
of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights and the strengthening of 
democratic institutions and the rule of law’ (HCNM, 1993, p. 14). These issues 
were also placed in the context of migration; still, by highlighting ‘rights’ as 
well as ‘problems’, the report presented Roma as rights-bearing individuals 
11 The report also notes that, in addition to economic opportunity, ‘quality of life’ includes an ‘enduring sense 
of belonging’ and ‘greater confidence in the capacity of government authorities to protect human rights, 
ensure the rule of law, and promote tolerance and understanding within the society-at-large … ’.
12 For example, Hungary abolished this distinction only with its 1993 minorities law; the February 1992 
draft still maintained the distinction and was withdrawn only following opposition from minority groups 
(Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1996, p. 111).
13 Italy and Spain continue to deny Roma preferential treatment on a par with that accorded to national 
minority groups, despite the historical presence of large numbers of Roma on their territories (EUMAP, 
2002). However, these western European countries were not the focus of the HCNM’s attention in 1993.
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and communities rather than merely as a generalized social or security concern. 
At the same time, it reinforced the idea that human and minority rights issues 
within a given country could be understood consistently with, even as part of, 
Europe’s security architecture.
Finally, the HCNM’s report alluded to the importance of involving Roma 
in policy-making (HCNM, 1993, pp. 9, 14). Though not described in minor-
ity rights terms, this constituted implicit recognition of Romani communities’ 
entitlement to a right historically attached to national minority regimes – politi-
cal participation (FIER, 1999) – and contributed to the development of a new 
rhetorical approach to Roma as integrated, politically empowered actors.
Still, having issued his report, the HCNM did not follow the situation of 
Roma systematically; indeed, he made only one public reference to the Roma 
in the next six years (HCNM, 1994). This may have been due in part to the 
HCNM’s concern about ‘involv[ing himself] in only those situations that meet 
the criteria of the mandate’ (HCNM 1993, p. 13). This concern was reflected 
in his recommendation that ‘a point of contact for Roma issues’ be created 
within the office of democratic initiatives and human rights (HCNM, 1993, p. 
15), with the suggestion that its human rights-based mandate might be more 
appropriate for addressing the problems faced by Romani communities. Clearly, 
there were competing visions within European institutions as to whether the 
problems of Roma were a security issue, a social issue, or a rights issue, or 
indeed what the proper relationship between security, socio-economic reform, 
and rights is for policy addressing marginalized groups. 
Indeed, it is worth asking why European institutions approached the HCNM 
about a migration problem unrelated to conflict in the first place. Seeing a 
problem, but seeing also that it related to an ethnic group, the OSCE turned to 
the one institution dealing expressly with minority issues. In so doing, what had 
initially been primarily a concern about migration was in part transformed into, 
or at least addressed as, a human rights issue. Despite the HNCM’s mandate 
conservatism, he did address the issue, establishing a set of institutional and 
rhetorical expectations about migration and minorities. In 2000 he returned 
to this question. 
The HCNM Report of 2000 
By 2000 the context within which the HCNM was operating had changed 
dramatically. The EU enlargement process had replaced the OSCE and CoE at 
the centre of debates about the eastward expansion of Europe, and an at least 
rhetorical commitment to ‘common values’ and integration appeared to have 
replaced the preoccupation with security and the potential for ethnic conflict 
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that had dominated the early 1990s.14 The genesis of the 2000 report reflects 
this change in context. In contrast to the 1993 report, presented as the fulfilment 
of an assignment from the committee of senior officials, the HCNM offered 
this justification for undertaking the 2000 report of his own volition:
As time passed, I noted in many parts of Europe the persistent plight of the 
Roma and Sinti … [who] were generally left outside the scope and beyond 
the reach of progressive developments. Moreover, the persistence of racially-
motivated hatred and violence directed against the Roma and Sinti can only 
be considered a blight on the records of individual participating States and of 
European society in general. … My intention in embarking upon this study 
was … principally to raise the awareness of policy makers to the particular 
situation and needs of Roma and Sinti, to focus debate on their conditions, and 
to offer some general recommendations … I hope that in the new millennium 
all OSCE participating States will prove fully responsive to the needs of Roma 
and Sinti and wholly respectful of their rights. As a community of values, the 
OSCE must assure this for all. (HCNM, 2000, emphasis added) 
Concerns about whether or not the situation of Roma fell within his mandate 
evidently did not prevent the HCNM from revisiting the issues he had raised 
in 1993. But his justification also suggests two important changes marked by 
the 2000 report: in geographic focus, and in the balance between security and 
rights. The 2000 report explores the situation of Roma and Sinti in ‘many parts 
of Europe’ – that is, in western Europe as well as the CEE region. By 2000 
the HCNM was asserting that ‘discrimination and exclusion are fundamental 
features of the Roma experience’ and that all OSCE Member States, ‘as a 
community of values’ had a democratic obligation to take corrective measures 
on human rights grounds (HCNM, 2000, Foreword 1). 
The HCNM’s 2000 recommendations also offer a comprehensive vision 
of individual and minority rights, calling for more effective protection against 
racial violence and discrimination, as well as opportunities to cultivate a dis-
tinct Romani identity. The HCNM refers to OSCE documents to bolster his 
recommendation that Roma be integrally involved, as Roma, in developing 
policies that affect them (HCNM, 2000, pp. 7–9). And although there is much 
more discussion of rights, there is no reference to migration.15
The difference in tone and substance is striking – the 2000 report is 175 
pages long, as compared to just 18 pages in 199316 – begging the question of 
14 The broader security situation had changed dramatically: in 1993, war was still raging in Bosnia and the 
Transdniestria conflict had only recently subsided. By 2000, the former Yugoslavia was largely at peace, 
and the geopolitical uncertainty of the immediate post-cold war had receded considerably.
15 Perhaps as a corollary to this, the 2000 report also places relatively less emphasis on socio-economic 
issues; one commentator refers to the report’s ‘reluctance to examine economic aspects of the Roma as a 
policy subject’ (Kovats, in Guy, 2001, p. 99).
16 The United States Department of State provided substantial funding to support research for the 2000 
report, which may in part explain its greater length.
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what had changed. Was Roma migration really no longer an issue? Had human 
and minority rights been accepted as an integral component of an expanded 
notion of security? And had ensuring a better situation for Roma really become 
a requirement for membership of the European community of values? 
From 1993 to 2000: The Dynamic between Rhetoric and Policy
To answer these questions, we should consider the divergent policy approaches 
advocated by EU institutions during the period of these reports. These ap-
proaches – human rights implementation, socio-economic investment, and 
migration prevention – appear on a spectrum from highly rhetorical value 
commitments to the rational defence of interests.
First, the Copenhagen criteria were adopted in June 1993, at the same time 
as the HCNM was working on his first report. The choice to identify political 
criteria including ‘respect for and protection of minorities’ as a condition of 
accession placed the EU in a delicate position: candidates were to be measured 
against a standard of minority protection for which there was no foundation in 
EU law, no definition, no monitoring mechanism, and widely varying practice 
between Member States (Hughes and Sasse, 2003, pp. 12–13). Nevertheless, 
once set, this criterion somehow needed to be assessed for candidates to gain 
admission to a community that itself neither knew what the standard meant 
nor applied it to its own members.
Perhaps cognizant of these difficulties, the Commission asserted in the 
first regular reports on progress towards accession in 1998 that the political 
criteria had been met in nine of the ten CEE candidates.17 Although ‘meeting 
the criteria’ implied a one-time assessment, the Commission continued to 
monitor candidates on minority protection and the other criteria. The 1999 ac-
cession partnerships specified ‘integration’ of Roma as a priority for Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia,18 and the Commission 
devoted a considerable part of its regular reports’ ‘minority rights’ section to 
Roma, detailing infringements of their civil, political, economic and social 
rights, but making no reference to migration.
Second, in 1998 the Directorate-General on Enlargement began allocating 
significant assistance to ‘Roma minorities programmes’, primarily in Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, through its Phare pro-
gramme.19 Presumably, this funding was intended to support candidate states 
in addressing some of the problems identified in the regular reports. However, 
17 Slovakia did not receive a positive assessment until 1999, after the Mečiar government had lost power.
18 See accession partnerships at «http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/aps.htm».
19 These were the five candidates with the largest Roma populations. ‘Integration of Roma’ had been identi-
fied as a priority in the accession partnerships concluded in 1999. Phare also supported programmes for the 
Kirtimai Roma community in Lithuania.
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rather than dealing with minority protection or rights, ‘most Phare programmes 
were developed as socio-economic interventions designed to deal with some 
aspects of the social exclusion experienced by many Roma minority popu-
lations’ (European Commission Evaluation Unit, 2004, p. 1). A significant 
percentage of Phare funding supported equipment purchases or infrastructure 
development (particularly in isolated Romani communities) or ‘social integra-
tion’ (European Commission Evaluation Unit, 2004, pp. 63–4).
The EU’s evaluation criticizes Phare programmes’ lack of a ‘well-informed, 
clear vision or goal to define exactly what Roma inclusion means and how 
this will be achieved’; the Phare programmes appear to have been developed 
without reference to the CoE and HCNM’s rights-based articulations of Romani 
interests. Overall, the Phare programme’s funding pattern suggests an identifi-
cation of Roma minority issues with socio-economic concerns and a persistent 
if unvoiced preoccupation with migration – a conclusion supported by the 
comments of CEE officials20 and parallel patterns of bilateral assistance.21
Third, migration concerns surfaced more openly within the Commission’s 
Directorate-General on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), which channelled 
considerable assistance to candidate states to tackle customs, border security 
and control, and migration issues. For example, between 1998–2002 the Odys-
seus programme funded a range of exchanges, training and research projects 
on asylum and immigration,22 including an examination of ‘Current Irregular 
Migration of Roma to the Member States’ by the International Centre for 
Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).23
That project’s report reveals persistent concerns about Roma as migrants. 
The project was motivated by the ‘increased number of asylum requests by 
citizens from European states that are considered to be safe and are to become 
EU Members’ and aimed to
analyse the background to these recent flows … to find out which measures 
can be taken to avoid them and how to react when they take place, without 
20 The Czech Human Rights Commissioner suggested this reading of EU motivation in supporting a policy 
to improve the situation for Roma: ‘It can be expected that the result of this social edification of the hitherto 
marginalised Romany community and the gradual formation of an emancipated Romany minority will lead to 
a perceptible fall in Romany migration to European Union countries’ (cited in Vermeersch, 2003, p. 24). 
21 For example, a government programme to improve the situation for Roma in the Małopolska region of 
Poland stated that: ‘the situation of Roma in Central and Eastern Europe is a matter of special interest to 
European institutions and the European Member States, which results mainly from fears of migration. This 
was clearly demonstrated in bilateral contacts with, inter alia, British, Finnish and Irish authorities during 
the last two years’ (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, ‘Pilot Government Programme for the 
Roma Community in the Małopolska Province for the years 2001–2003’, February 2001, cited in EUMAP, 
2001, p. 378, fn. 159).
22 See «http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/project/odysseus/index_en.htm».
23 The project also received funding from the governments of Norway, Switzerland and the UK (see ICMPD, 
2001, p. 4; Commission Report to the Parliament, 2000, p. 51).
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compromising the existing asylum procedures or putting a strain on relations 
with Candidate States by imposing visa obligations. (ICMPD, 2001, p. 4)
The ICMPD report suggests that Roma were migrating ‘mainly for economic 
reasons … and therefore host countries regard this to be an abuse of the asylum 
system’24 and regrets the ‘damag[e] to the EU association process’ caused by 
the resulting imposition of visa regimes on migration-producing countries. Im-
proving the situation for Roma is presented as a means of eliminating the ‘push 
factors’ that contribute to migration (ICMPD, 2001, p. 36). The report sug-
gests that restrictive policies are necessary and justified to deter bogus asylum 
applicants (pp. 19–25), but downplays possible human rights implications.25 
Consistent with the report’s logic, migration concerns have led individual EU 
Member States to adopt highly restrictive immigration policies clearly aimed 
at discouraging the entry of Roma.26 Around the time the 2000 HCNM report 
was issued, then, Roma migration continued to be a concern for many Member 
States – a concern that could trump human rights. 
Thus perhaps the greatest shift between 1993 and 2000 was towards a com-
partmentalization of functions and an increased rhetorical sophistication, rather 
than any consensus on the underlying conceptualizations of policy. European 
institutions recognized Roma as a minority, referred to the rights dimension of 
their situation, and responded to the socio-economic marginalization of Roma 
with increased investment.27 Yet to the extent that they continued to migrate 
westwards, or were thought likely to, Roma were still seen as a ‘problem’, 
albeit one preferably resolved by persuading them to stay where they were 
rather than by resort to explicitly anti-immigration measures that could damage 
the EU’s image as a ‘community of values’.
24 For a contrasting view, see CoE (1999, paras 51–2), noting that migration of Roma is spurred by both ‘a 
strong attitude of non-confidence and non-identification with the majority and its institutions in the respec-
tive countries of origin’ and ‘strong external features … such as organised and repeated hostilities, single 
acts of violence …, or change of status due to the emergence of new states or new citizenship provisions’. 
It emphasizes that Roma migration is ‘proportionally no higher than the average migration to Western 
Europe [from CEE] countries’.
25 For instance, the report comments on the ‘dramatic’ effect (in terms of decrease in asylum applications) 
of the deportation of 74 Romani asylum-seekers from Belgium in October 1999, but does not mention that 
this occurred despite a request for a stay by the European Court of Human Rights. In 2002, the Court ruled 
that the deportation had violated the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, 2002).
26 For example, in 2001, the British Home Office concluded an agreement with the Czech government 
allowing ‘pre-screening’ of passengers by British immigration officials in Prague’s airport to turn back 
suspected asylum claimants; one investigation found that Roma were 400 times more likely to be turned 
back. The Law Lords ruled that this system ‘was inherently and systemically discriminatory on racial 
grounds against Roma, contrary to section 1(1)(a) of the Race Relations Act’ (House of Lords, 2004). 
Interestingly, the HCNM, in his 1993 report, had anticipated that this type of problematic situation might 
arise (HCNM, 1993, p. 13).
27 The European Council at Tampere signalled support for the HCNM’s recommendations by adopting them 
together with the recommendations of the CoE’s specialist group, giving them added weight in EU policy 
and programming (Cocen Group, 1999).
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These factors point up a disjunction between the EU’s rhetorical commit-
ments, on the one hand, and its motivations in allocating resources to prevent 
migration, on the other. Similarly, its insistence on respect for minority rights 
in candidate states was not grounded in internal EU standards and policies, 
which contradicted its commitment to common values. The ‘cognitive dis-
sonance’ created by this disjunction may have undermined the legitimacy 
and efficacy of EU policies towards minorities and Roma in particular.28 As 
the day of accession grew closer, the question became increasingly salient of 
what would happen when candidates were transformed into members – and 
their Romani populations into citizens – of an EU with no clear policies for 
minority protection.
III. The EU: Migrating towards a Union Minority Policy
Civil society groups and Romani leaders have seized on the gaps between 
rhetoric and reality to press for a more coherent minority protection policy, 
inside and outside the Union. Having put the issue of minority protection on 
the agenda for accession, EU states were in effect ‘entrapped’ (Schimmelfen-
nig, 2001), finding it embarrassing not to look at these issues within the EU. 
Indeed, the draft Constitutional Treaty incorporated the Copenhagen minority 
protection criterion for all Member States (Draft Constitutional Treaty, 2003, 
Art. I-2). In a sense, this ‘entrapment’ represents the unexpected consequences 
of an idea, yet this was not merely rhetoric shaping reality: without the un-
derlying interest in security – concerning migration but also the integrity of 
the inter-state project – and the existence of other European norms of process 
and equality, the rhetorical pull of minority protection might well have faded 
with accession. Even now, the normative pull of minority rights within the EU 
is limited in scope.29
Yet despite the tensions between security, socio-economic and rights per-
spectives, with the publication of the HCNM’s 2000 report, Roma and other 
minorities acquired powerful rhetorical tools to argue for their claims as com-
munities. Rights organizations were able to articulate the case for minority 
protection in terms of process and basic fairness: if respect for and protection 
of minorities was a criterion, its substance in law and policy would have to 
be articulated. If minority protection was to be applied in candidate states as 
a criterion of membership, why not in members as well? Would not ongoing 
28 See Schimmelfennig (2001). Many commentators have questioned the extent to which the emphasis placed 
on improving the situation for Roma in the accession process has in fact led to meaningful improvements in 
most CEE Romani communities (see HCNM, 2000; EUMAP, 2002; Kovats, 2003; Guy, 2001).
29 Contrast the limited commitment to minority protection in the draft Constitutional Treaty with the strong 
anti-discrimination standards of the race equality directive of 2000.
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monitoring to forestall backsliding be of use in Member States as well as 
candidates?30
Some Roma political and community leaders pressed critiques mobilizing 
these various policy strands to address institutional concern about migration 
with a distinct orientation towards rights; for example the 2003 collective 
declaration of Romani associations noted that:
migration is often a sign and symptom of a lack of equal opportunity at 
home, in terms of education, employment, housing, health, credit and public 
services. We note lately manifestations of discrimination against Roma in 
both their home countries and ‘host countries’ concerning the freedom of 
circulation in the time of an [sic] unified Europe. Rules established between 
candidate countries and Member States of the European Union are applied 
in a discriminatory way. If we agree with combating illegal migration, this 
kind of migration, which is not so widespread among Roma, only could be 
reduced when the livelihood of all citizens is guaranteed at home. We rec-
ognise racism and discrimination as the underlying cause of the inequality 
suffered by Roma across Europe. (Collective Declaration, 2003) 
This kind of critique unites calls for equal process across the European space 
with concerns about economic conditions and exclusion. Moreover, in the 
declaration Romani activists stake claims not for economic transfers but for 
initiatives to promote social integration and ‘stronger effort to fully involve 
Roma in democratic processes’ (Collective Declaration, 2003, Point 3).31 The 
move by Romani leaders to include rights claims alongside resource transfers 
was not solely a product of policy disputes between European elites. To be 
sure, the increased activism of Romani organizations since the end of the 
communist period might well have proceeded – and focused on Europe and 
discrimination – without the rhetorical tensions created by European institu-
tions’ parallel policies;32 indeed, Romani activism itself helped channel the 
focus and activities of European institutions.33 Yet the tensions arising out 
of the accession project probably increased the scope of action for Romani 
30 See, e.g., EU Network of Independent Experts (2003, p. 174) (criticizing the failure of Member States 
to ratify the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities ‘although according to the 
criteria of Copenhagen, the ratification of the Framework Convention is a condition imposed on the States 
who have applied to join the European Union’) (EUMAP, 2002, Overview).
31 The declaration calls for: funding for legal representation, voter education and registration; integration 
of Roma into mainstream media and expansion of Romani press centres; support for Roma to study law; 
and Romani universities (Collective Declaration, 2003, Points 1, 3, 4, 5, 6a–b).
32 ‘Roma activists and intellectuals are beginning to work together to create a network of groups and organi-
sations which can tap into the corridors of power in the European Union in an effort to improve the social, 
economic and political situation of Roma in Europe’ (Gheorghe, 1991, pp. 840–4, cited in Clark).
33 See, e.g., Russinov (2002,  pp. 188–90 ), discussing interactions with the Council of Europe and the European 
Roma Rights Centre in the work of a Roma coalition to define anti-discrimination policy in Bulgaria.
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groups, and over time it defined the most productive and compelling forms 
their message could take.
Institutional actors were also aware of the problems a double standard 
posed and the opportunities it created for change within the Union. In 2002, 
the HNCM34 noted that accession’s normative commitments had improved 
the position of minorities in the candidate states and that these commitments 
could not be confined to the accession period:
[O]ver the past decade, the incentive of living up to the Copenhagen criteria 
has been an important impetus for the governments of applicant States to adopt 
or improve policies and laws to protect and promote the rights of persons 
belonging to national minorities. … This leads me to a point which I believe 
needs to be seriously considered. … What are the EU’s own standards when 
it comes to the protection of national minorities? It is clear that the Copen-
hagen criteria are important for clearing the bar to get into the EU, but what 
happens when you have passed that hurdle? Do the rules change? Surely the 
standards on which the Copenhagen criteria are based should be universally 
applicable. … Otherwise, the relationship between the existing and aspiring 
EU Members States [sic] would be unbalanced in terms of applicable stand-
ards. I believe such an imbalance would also be inconsistent with declared 
EU values and raise serious doubts about the normative foundations of the 
EU itself. (HCNM 2002, p. 4) 
Prior to the accession process, these ‘normative foundations’ had not encom-
passed minority protection. Externally oriented security concerns prompted 
the initial pronouncement of minority protection; internally oriented norms 
of equality subsequently made it difficult to prevent minority protection from 
encompassing Member States as accession became an imminent reality. Once 
the new states joined, the Union’s own logic required they not be subject to 
radically different norms, but the only other coherent solution – abandon-
ment of the Copenhagen criteria – would have made the double standard all 
too apparent and risked the gains minority protection outside the Union were 
thought to have achieved. Instead, progressive extension of minority protection 
norms to all Member States provides a way to meet the concerns of various 
actors: those concerned with migration as a security issue, those with rights 
or socio-economic orientations, and those concerned with the EU’s integrity 
as a normative project.
The Migration of Policy after Accession
Concern with migration drove much of European policy towards Roma in the 
1990s. Yet with accession, the social, rights, and security issues surrounding 
34 Rolf Ekeus replaced Max van der Stoel as HCNM in July 2001.
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Roma became internal issues.35 With accession, a Union whose members had 
gone to great lengths to restrict Roma migration now on a single day admitted 
over a million Roma, who have become both citizens of the Union and members 
of its largest minority. Even if Europe has principally been concerned with 
Romani migration, with accession it has become apparent that a migration 
model is insufficient. The EU’s fundamental equality norms mean that simply 
by staying where they are – and in the conditions in which many of them live 
– Roma have become a concern for an EU that has come to them.
Movement of Roma from one EU Member State to another is now difficult 
either to restrict or to classify as a ‘problem’, since that movement is protected 
by fundamental EU norms (Braham and Braham, 2000, pp. 105–10). Yet, while 
accession has altered the legal and political framework of possibility relating 
to minorities and migration, it has not altered the underlying security and 
social integration concerns that drove pre-accession policy. Since accession 
has made direct restrictions on migration by EU citizens all but impossible, 
the tools available to address continuing concerns about Roma migration have 
changed, though the concern has not.36
For example, during the accession period several Member States took 
measures to restrict asylum applications by Roma from CEE countries. With 
accession, freedom of movement makes asylum moot, and in any event an 
asylum claim originating in another Member State would represent a serious 
crisis for the Union, since it would necessarily imply a failure to uphold the 
core political criteria underpinning membership.37 Yet the underlying socio-
economic situation and rights of Roma in the CEE states have not necessarily 
improved – these issues have been internalized with no new mechanism being 
put in place to respond to them except the norms of minority protection (Braham 
and Braham, 2000, pp. 106–10). Thus, the fact that the UK can no longer deny 
immigration to Czech Roma38 or that Belgium cannot return Roma asylum 
applicants (Cahn and Vermeersch, 2000) does not mean that the perceived 
economic burdens, social disruptions or security concerns underlying earlier 
restrictions will not sound in domestic British or Belgian policies. Accession 
35 Transitional restrictions on free movement will continue, but with a clear timeline for their termination, 
after which CEE citizens will have identical movement rights as other EU citizens (see Rigo, 2005, pp. 
16–17).
36 This concern is not necessarily well founded. Only 15 per cent of migrants into the EU since 1989 have 
been from the CEE states (Zielonka, 2001, p. 520), and migration of Roma has not been significantly higher 
than that of non-Roma (Matras, 2000, p. 47). There is also reason to suppose westward migration will not 
dramatically increase with accession (Kraus and Schwager, 2003).
37 The concept that EU membership makes asylum claims moot presupposes a minimum level of common 
political commitment by each Member State; failure to meet such a minimum could elicit a response by the 
EU or other Member States, as happened with Austria after the Freedom Party entered government.
38 As noted above, the Law Lords have recently held against this practice on human rights grounds (House 
of Lords, 2004) but, even if they had not, it would have been unavailable as a matter of policy after 
accession.
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has limited members’ options for excluding Roma at their borders, but the 
concerns that motivated such policies will persist and seek other outlets.39
Even if Roma do not migrate, their exclusion and impoverishment pose 
different policy challenges for a Union that must now deal with them as citi-
zens and minorities. Roma populate the whole taxonomy both of minorities 
– cultural, social, political – and of migrants – political, economic, and (for 
those from outside the EU) illegal.40 The development of minority policy, at 
least as regards Roma, was governed by a particular conjunction of persistent 
concerns about migration and the implications of impending citizenship for 
large numbers of Roma, and it is not clear that the lesson is replicable for true 
migrant groups. The many connections between migrant and minority – the 
sense of difference, the fact that migrants often form new minorities – coexist 
with a practical hierarchy between the two, a passage from an impermanent, 
marginal status to membership. For all the problems that attach to minority 
status, it is often an improvement on the prospects confronting the migrant. We 
may expect some members of recent migrant communities, such as Muslims, 
to resist being consigned to a ‘permanent migrant’ status. The project of inte-
grating different communities is still very much seen as a security issue for the 
Union; in the same speech in which he discussed the need for common norms, 
the HCNM warned of the dangers should such normative integration fail:
[D]iscrimination, racism, intolerance and xenophobia not only persist across 
Europe, but in some cases are gaining strength. It is also clear that such ideas 
remain powerful mobilizing agents for populists, and that EU membership 
provides no immunity in this regard. In particular, religious intolerance 
– especially anti-Semitism and Islamophobia – have not abated and could 
open fissures within our societies. These are issues that Europe must address 
in order to prevent intra-State cleavages from cracking the bigger inter-State 
project. (HCNM, 2002, p. 7)
Conclusion: A Balanced Policy for the Union? 
Contrary to many observers’ expectations, it is the Union that has migrated, 
while most Roma have stayed where they are. What would constitute a policy 
responsive to the range of concerns – security, social integration, equality, 
human and minority rights, the Union’s integrity – that the continuing social 
and economic exclusion of Roma implicates? Many observers critical of 
anti-migration policies tend to advocate either a rights-based or a socio-
39 These policy instruments will still be available against Roma or other migrants from non-Member States, 
which are likely to continue to be seen predominantly as a security concern and treated as such. Concern with
mass immigration has encouraged discrimination in old Member States, and can be expected to do the same 
in the CEE states as they increasingly receive migration as well as produce it (Mudde, 2005, p. 184).
40 See taxonomies outlined in the introduction to this special issue.
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economic alternative. Yet, it seems clear that rights, investment and security 
are interrelated, and that a single-minded focus on any one aspect in isolation 
is insufficient and may actually produce harmful policy outcomes. Exclusive 
concern with security can excuse abuses of communities already pressed 
to the margins, yet ignoring societies’ legitimate concern with stability and 
prosperity in the face of population movements or assertions of difference is 
not realistic either. Similarly, relying on humanitarianism to underpin human 
rights or social investment may not be as effective as linking those policies to a 
security interest in restricting migration; on the other hand, securitizing social 
and rights commitments can reduce support for them when the underlying 
security concerns are met. There are also perverse incentives in an unbalanced 
approach: for example, favouring collective rights over investment could lower 
the financial cost of addressing Romani issues, while delivering fewer economic 
goods to individual Roma who confront both discriminatory exclusion and 
poverty. 
An exclusive focus on collective rights risks ghettoizing Roma politics, 
reducing access to public services and excluding Roma from effective participa-
tion. It could provoke a reaction from majorities if funding is earmarked for the 
minority. Identifying all Roma as a single community may be a rational policy 
choice, but Roma from different parts of Europe have highly diverse languages 
and cultures, and it would not be obvious to many Roma communities that they 
share a single identity; many would oppose homogenization (Marushiakova 
and Popov, in Guy, 2001, pp. 33–50). Conversely, collective politics could give 
Roma greater bargaining power, and the social marginalization Roma already 
suffer is so pervasive that it is not clear further ghettoization would occur.
A balanced policy would have to address the high unemployment, low 
education and socio-economic marginalization that affect Roma. Even if 
pervasive majority prejudice could be reversed, individual Roma would still 
be in extremely disadvantaged positions demanding attention and investment 
from EU institutions whether or not they move west. Yet the socio-economic 
problems confronting Roma, important as they are, cannot be separated from 
that broader context of pervasive discrimination (Waters and Guglielmo, 1996, 
p. 297).  It is an open question if any policy can affect discriminatory attitudes, 
yet precisely because there is little reason to think that majority attitudes can 
be ameliorated in the near term, we believe that increased support for politi-
cal participation by Roma, as Roma and citizens, holds the most promise of 
effecting change and combating harm. Politically empowered communities 
are better able to define and defend their own interests, even in absence of 
agreement on effective policy measures (Piana, 2004, pp. 34–6). Alongside 
rights commitments, therefore, such a policy would prioritize investments in 
effective political participation, such as literacy and education, rather than in 
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wealth creation. Given the determinative role of majority prejudice, an effective 
policy would also have to begin to identify common interests in security and 
in the success of the integrative Union project, by seeking to demonstrate to 
majorities their interest, with minorities, in protection of cultural differences 
and in assuring each community’s participation in policy-making within a 
Union that has no majority.
In practice, this ‘constitutive and participatory approach’ implies greater 
attention to constructing policy in co-ordination with minority communities, 
an approach embodied in the recommendations of the CoE’s specialist group, 
which emphasize the importance of Romani involvement in community af-
fairs, rights monitoring, political processes and institutions (CoE, 1999, paras 
57–9).41 Those recommendations also note that efforts to ‘prevent … the causes 
of migration … need to concentrate more specifically on conflict prevention 
if they are to remove the causes for non-confidence and non-identification of 
Roma in mainstream societies in the countries of origin’ (CoE, 1999, para. 
54). A balanced policy thus has to combat prejudice, promote investment in 
Romani individuals and communities, and support collective identity and 
participation. Yet it will have to do so in a fashion not principally motivated 
by a desire to suppress migration. 
The 1993 HCNM report suggests a European policy preoccupied, not with 
ameliorating socio-economic marginalization for the sake of excluded popula-
tions, or even for the health of the societies in which they live, but with fore-
stalling undesired migration for the sake of the recipient countries. Whatever 
rhetorical and policy shifts we may identify in the 2000 HCNM report, there 
is little indication that this preoccupation has changed (Matras, 2000, p. 47). It 
is an interesting theoretical question how much intentionality matters in policy 
formulation, but common sense suggests that underlying intentions may affect 
resource commitments at the margins in policy implementation.
Rhetorical-action or deliberative theories suggest that actors’ choices pro-
duce outcomes that lower the cognitive dissonance between their public com-
mitments and their individual preferences (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Neyer, 2003; 
Piana, 2004). If this is right, the process is surely iterative: not only policy, but 
understandings of the purposes of policy and its implementation are shaped in 
this fashion. When the implementation of a policy itself comes into tension with 
public value commitments, cognitive dissonance will generate another round of 
adjustment. Over time, it is difficult to imagine that investment policies whose 
effective purpose is to discourage exercise of a right of free movement will 
always choose what is best for the flourishing of individuals and communities, 
rather than what is best for discouraging their movement.
41 The specialist group is led by and has substantive participation by Romani experts.
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Whatever their formal consistency with the acquis communautaire, policies 
designed to discourage freedom of movement do not seem compatible with the 
fundamental commitments, the ‘common values,’ of the Union. At the least, 
such policies suggest a different Union, one in which identity and community 
are protected as much by separation as by integration. That may be an accept-
able vision – and many aspects of the present European project suggest it is 
– but it may not serve the interests of individuals and communities such as the 
Roma who do not form a majority in any one Member State.
There is reason to expect that minority protection will remain on the agenda 
and increasingly be interpreted as a rights issue, albeit one with an important 
security and integrative component. The concerns that led Member States to 
elevate minority protection to a priority of the Union in the early 1990s combine 
with the logic and processes of membership to create an opening for minorities 
to advance their agenda in a way states will find difficult to contain. Minority 
rights, like rights generally, have proved a rhetorical stimulus to policy change. 
As Landau (2004) argues:
The EU cannot remain ambiguous forever, because an integrated Europe 
precisely requires new understandings of how states and societies relate to 
each other. It may take several years before the EU is pushed to standardize 
minority rights, but the seeds of minority activism at the supranational level 
have already been planted by currently vague strategies of interpreting and 
implementing minority rights. … [T]he more groups that are incorporated 
under EU auspices and the more diverse the European Union becomes, the 
more difficult it will be to ignore the gap between minority rights rhetoric 
and state’s obligations to uphold minority rights. 
Given the seriousness of the problems Romani communities throughout Europe 
continue to confront, rhetorical and conceptual advancements may seem cold 
comfort. Yet precisely because the real solutions to the problems that confront 
Roma may lie, not in anti-discrimination directives, social investment strategies, 
or the articulation of rights, but in changing attitudes among majorities, the 
change may be critical: no longer seen and spoken of as if they were migrants, 
Roma may finally be arriving as European minorities.
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